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United Nations Development Programme Yemen
The Peace Support Facility for Yemen Phase I
Final Report
End date: March 2023

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United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) – Yemen

End date: March 2023

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	Netherlands	US\$ 2,246,966
	NorCap	US\$ 295,183
	Norway	US\$ 1,072, 464
	Sweden	US\$ 1,077,702
	Swiss Development Corporation (SDC)	US\$ 1,016,260
	United Kingdom	US\$ 2,094,241
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UNDP Contact Person	Zena Ali Ahmad Resident Representative UNDP Yemen Email: zena.ali-ahmad@undp.org Abdo Seif OIC Team Leader, Oversight and Support Team UNDP Yemen Email: abdo.seif@undp.org Klaus Kristensen OIC Peace Support Facility Manager UNDP Yemen Email: klaus.kristensen@undp.org	

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ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Ansar Allah
CBY	Central Bank of Yemen
CHM	Civilian Harm Mitigation
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPGs	Community Protection Groups
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DFA	De Facto Authorities
FSO	Floating Storage and Offloading
IRG	Internationally Recognized Government
MoE	Ministry of Education
MOSAL	Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NAP	National Action Plan
NRC/NORCAP	The Norwegian Refugee Council
OSEGSY	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to Yemen
PMU	Project Management Unit
POC	Protection of Civilians
PSF	Peace Support Facility
PWP	Public Works Project
RCO	Resident Coordinator's Office
SCMCHA	Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
SSOP	Safer Salvage Operation Project
UNMHA	United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNVIM	United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen
WFP	World Food Programme
WPS	Women Peace Security
WRTC	Women Research and Training Center
YRSPC	Yemen Red Sea Ports Corporation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Peace Support Facility (PSF), Phase I was established in 2019 to support the implementation of the Stockholm and Hodeidah peace agreements in Yemen. Phase I focused on implementing agreements reached by the parties during the negotiations led by the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Yemen. It aimed to create tangible rapid improvements in people's lives and to demonstrate concrete alternatives to the conflict, creating local demand for peace.

PSF interventions work to incentivize the parties to deepen their engagement in the UN-led process and is structured around implementing three outputs:

Output 1 the Stockholm and Hodeidah peace agreements; Output 2: interventions emerging from ongoing Track II dialogue; Output 3: transitional government and post-peace agreements.

Output 1 was linked to two activities, the rehabilitation of the ports of Hodeidah and support to the FSO Safer tanker operation.

Based upon the UNDP Yemen and Port of Rotterdam 2019 damage assessment rehabilitation to the Ports of Hodeidah took place with some interventions carried over to the Phase II due to delays caused by international sanctions and the sensitive working relationship with the De Facto Authorities (DFA). Additionally, the rehabilitation of the Marib Power Plant was considered as a confidence-building initiative but, due to increased hostilities, was not pursued.

The PSF also developed the initial Floating Storage and Offloading (FSO) Safer Salvage Operational Project (SSOP) project document and continued to support its implementation through PSF, Phase II e lead of the Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO).

Output 2 was fully implemented by three initiatives supporting resiliency and emergency operational capacities in school, supporting human rights capacity-building of local security forces, and enhancing community safety. The garbage collection initiative along the front line in Taiz was not possible due to active and shifting frontlines, and the water rehabilitation initiative in Dhamar was carried over to Phase II.

Output 3 never came to fruition due to developments in the conflict and was modified for Phase II.

The mid-term review (MTR) provided the foundation for the strategic framework and PSF Phase II. The lessons learned from Phase I that have been accounted for in Phase II include: (a) a general focus on confidence-building mechanisms – as recommended by the (RCO) and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen (OSEGSY); (b) a move away from projects stemming from the Track II dialogue and toward general peacebuilding, which provided more independence for the PSF; and (c) a reorientation towards specialized projects that do not depend on transitional governance and post-peace agreements.

Following the MTR recommendations, the PSF included a stand-alone gender portfolio and support for the National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). Despite obstacles such as shifting dynamics and rigorous procedures, the expected results from the original project document were surpassed.

The total expenditure incurred with contractual commitment was US\$ 19,425,003 as of end of project in March 2023.

BACKGROUND

After eight years of protracted conflict, Yemen is still one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. The impact has been devastating, as tens of thousands of civilians have been killed or injured, and infrastructure throughout the country has been severely damaged or destroyed.

The PSF Phase I project document was established following the Stockholm Peace Agreement in December 2018 under the auspices that the facility would implement initiatives agreed to by the parties during negotiations. Additionally, the PSF would support initiatives identified by the Special Envoy to further bolster broad peace efforts and generate demand for peace – particularly in marginalized areas – with contracts awarded to local companies. However, by September 2019, project agreement by the parties to the conflict proved challenging.

This resulted in the PSF Steering Committee creating two new funding Windows to incentivize community-led peacebuilding and reconciliation throughout Yemen. This included initiatives emerging from Track II dialogue (implemented) and support for transitional governance. Although the April 2022 – October 2022 truce resulted in a steady decline in battle-related incidents, it did not lead to a sustained peace process that would allow for PSF's engagement in transitional government mechanisms.

The PSF supports the peace process with initiatives that deliver tangible improvements in Yemeni's lives, building public support for the political process. However, without an official peace process, identifying new initiatives has been difficult. Furthermore, Yemen's dynamic political landscape has resulted in shifting priorities.



Photo: Construction workers rehabilitating the Training Center in Port of Hodeidah

PROGRESS REVIEW

The PSF has three windows to support Yemen's peace process with fast, flexible initiatives that deliver tangible, rapid improvements in the daily lives of people and reinforce and build public support for the political process.

OUTPUT 1: The implementation of the Stockholm Agreement or any other future agreement are supported through initiatives agreed by the parties.

This is linked to the rehabilitation of the Ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa, as well as support for the FSO Safer. No new peace agreements were made during Phase I.

The PSF has completed and continues to carry out extensive rehabilitation efforts on the ports helping secure port operations, including by providing spare parts for essential infrastructure. Issues were faced due to delays in clearance and approval processes, sanctions, border crossings, and local market availability. Some items will be included in Phase II using already committed funds.

1.1- Rehabilitation of Ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa.

UNDP was given the joint mandate of providing support to the Yemen Red Sea Ports Corporation (YRSPC), to mainly rehabilitate the port to pre-war operational capacity to facilitate the access and distribution of humanitarian aid and commercial shipments. To assist in the large-scale procurement envisaged, UNDP established a sub-office in Hodeidah that

would work closely with the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM), and the World Food Programme (WFP) to support the mandate.

The port rehabilitation relied upon an August 2019 comprehensive damage and capacity assessment that identified priorities for the port rehabilitation across three priority areas totalling €46,570,000 (approximately US\$ 50,275,342):

1. Priority 1 projects (estimated to be €2,850,000, approximately US\$ 3,075,000) necessary for maintaining the current port operations.
2. Priority 2 projects (estimated to be €18,720,000, approximately US\$ 20,210,000) to re-establish containerized cargo handling at the Port of Hodeidah.
3. Priority 3 projects (estimated to be €25,000,000, approximately US\$ 27,000,000) necessary to restore or improve the safety and sustainability of the port's operations and assets.

In tandem, the YRSPC submitted a list of priorities totalling US\$ 713,830,200 to which the PSF Steering Committee allocated a package of US\$ 7,000,000.

1.1-1. Rehabilitating the Port of Hodeidah Training Center

The Training Center was refurbished, furnished, and equipped with IT equipment in 2020, enabling the critical training of port staff – a key priority of the YRSPC. Since the rehabilitation, they have received training in Information Technology (IT), marine, fire, and safety awareness.



Photo: Port of Hodeidah Training Center prior to rehabilitation. UNDP

1.1-2. Assessment of electrical installations

The assessment was a priority 1 projects listed in the damage and capacity assessment, the purpose of which was (a) to ascertain the general condition of the electrical installations at the seaport (b) quantify electrical spare parts and other needs to allow the proper operation of the seaport and (c) define and estimate the costs of electrical systems rehabilitation works needed. It was completed in December 2019 and presented to the YRSPC, and no immediate action was taken. It remains relevant if the port needs to upscale its operations.

1.1-3. Liebherr cranes assessment

In July and August 2020, an assessment of the two Liebherr gantry cranes (ship-to-shore) was completed and shared with Liebherr for evaluation. Based on the evaluation, Liebherr appraised that the manufacturer. one of the cranes was

damaged beyond repair during the conflict, but it can be disassembled and used for spare parts. The second crane is repairable using new spare parts and the parts from the irreparable crane.

1.1-4. Procurement of spare parts for generators and rolling equipment

A series of spare parts for generators, rolling equipment, and tugboats were procured throughout Phase I, ensuring the operations of the ports without significant delays due to repairs.

1.1-5. Rehabilitation of the generator shelter

Designated as a Priority 1 project by the port authorities, the generator shelter underwent rehabilitation to safeguard against weather-related damage. This extension of the generator's lifespan is critical for the operationalized harbour, in alignment with the Stockholm Agreement. This rehabilitation work contributes to the improved functioning of the port, thereby ensuring its sustainability.

1.1-6. Rehabilitation of the maintenance workshop

This comprehensive rehabilitation covers various areas including the workshop, interior rooms, forklift shed, and fuel tank shed. The restoration of the workshop has significantly elevated port operations by substantially reducing equipment wear and tear. As a result, the longevity and operational sustainability of the port have been greatly improved.



Photo: Maintenance workshop before



Photo: Maintenance workshop after

1.1-7. 27 navigation buoys for marking the shipping lane

Twenty-seven buoys were procured to guide ships entering the port which is crucial for maintaining safety at sea. All the buoys were delivered to the Port of Hodeidah, and their installation is anticipated to take place in September 2023.



Photo: 27 navigation buoys awaiting shipment at manufacturer's shipyard. Gisman



Photo: Navigation buoy at arrival in the Port of Hodeidah. UNDP

1.1-8. Pilot boat

The Port of Hodeidah uses tugboats to transport pilots, which is neither cost efficient (high consumption of diesel), time efficient, nor safe. Identified as a Priority 3 project, a new pilot boat will reduce time and cost and increase the safety of the port staff significantly. At the time of writing, the production of the pilot boat is slightly ahead of schedule and is expected to be delivered in Hodeidah in June 2024, and has been carried over to PSF Phase II.



Photo: Pilot boat under construction in at the Jianglong Shipyard, Zhongshan, China. Evdemon & Partners

1.1-9. Slipway rehabilitation

The slipway and the winch room were unusable following the damages inflicted during the conflict. Being one of the recommended items for rehabilitation in the damage assessment, the PSF rehabilitated the winch room and procured a new wire rope, rails, and rail accessories so that the slipway is functionable again. At the time of writing, the winch room has been rehabilitated and most of the equipment has been delivered. The difficulty of importing equipment into DFA-controlled territory meant that spare parts for the slipway have been turned back and alternative routes are being identified. The outstanding items have been carried over to the PSF, Phase II.



Photo: Slipway facility before rehabilitation.UNDP



Photo: Slipway facility after rehabilitation.UNDP

1.1-10. Caterpillar generator

To ensure uninterrupted electricity to the port, a generator was listed in the damage assessment. It was delivered in January 2023.

1.1-11 Rehabilitation of oil berth 1 and berth 4

Hodeidah Port has seven berths – five of which are for general cargo and fuel and two are container berths. Berth 4 was identified as priority project 1 in the damage and capacity assessment, while oil berth no. 1 was identified as a project of emergency repair by the YRSPC, and the PSF has carried out extensive assessments of both. At the time of writing, the assessments are finalized and a procurement process for the rehabilitation has been initiated.

The changing political dynamics in Yemen meant that the rehabilitation of the Port of Hodeidah has less priority than when the PSF was established. Both berths were planned to be rehabilitated but the current funding will only allow for oil berth 1 to be rehabilitated during PSF, Phase II.

1.1-12. Tugboat engines

The PSF tried to procure the CUMMINS tugboat diesel engines, but they were not available on the market. Although the engines would have made one more tugboat operational, at the time of writing, the only alternative has been to purchase a new tugboat. There is currently no funding for this activity.

1.1-12. COVID 19 support

In 2021, nearly 2,000 COVID 19-related deaths and 11,000 cases were recorded in Yemen, however, it is suspected the reality was significantly higher due to lack of testing and social norms. To assist the YRSPC in preventing the spread of COVID 19, the PSF purchased face masks, hand sanitizers, and gloves for port staff.

1.2 Support to the FSO Safer operations

Since 2019, the FSO Safer, a 1970's era floating oil storage and offloading vessel has been moored off the coast of Hodeidah. It has not been maintained since the eruption of the conflict, and further deterioration could result in an explosion or large-scale oil spill with disastrous environmental consequences.

UNDP initially partnered with UNOPS for the project. However, the DFA requested significant changes to the scope of work, shifting from an assessment and minor updates to a full restoration of FSO Safer. This stalled progress.

In December 2021, UN principals decided to discontinue the UNOPS project and instead positioned UNDP to support the salvage operation under the leadership of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator. The PSF staff developed the FSO Safer Salvage Operation Project (SSOP) and implemented its first stage, including resource mobilization, defining the technical parameters, and providing operational support.

The ship-to-ship oil transfer was completed on 11 August 2023.




Photo: FSO safer ship-to-ship oil transfer. UNDP

1.3 Complimentary initiatives

1.3.1 An assessment of Marib Power Plant 1 and 2

The assessment was suggested in 2019. The RCO led the discussions with the two parties but the continued fighting in Marib did not allow the assessment to be carried out.

1.3.2 Assistance to ceasefire initiatives

Hala Systems services were contracted in 2019 to assist OSEGSY with monitoring a potential ceasefire with a focus on enhanced data tracking and reporting technology adaption and development. The PSF was also requested to propose an incentive structure for the parties to contribute to the monitoring efforts, however, these were never established as the conflict re-escalated.

1.3.3 Support to management of port revenues

In October 2019, fuel ships were prevented from entering the Port of Hodeidah due to their inability to meet the requirements of GoY Decree 49, which made it obligatory for all fuel importers to pay fuel imports taxes and customs. This led to a significant fuel crisis in the northern part of Yemen. The PSF provided technical support to OSEGSY to help identify a temporary solution to the management of the oil revenue and, to date, the parties have not officially agreed on any mechanism.

1.3.4 Sana'a International Airport assessment

While it is still operational, the Sana'a International Airport suffered extensive damage during the conflict. Multiple international actors had previously tried to assess the airport but, in mid-2022, the PSF was tasked with this and with conducting minor upgrades. After extensive advocacy efforts from contractor (Safer Yemen) to conduct the assessment, and from UN leadership, access for the aviation assessment experts was denied. The decision was received after the end of PSF, Phase I.

OUTPUT 2: Discreet activities emerging out of Track II initiatives are implemented with the goal of catalysing the political process

Output 2 was linked to initiatives recommended by the Special Envoy targeting vulnerable and marginalized groups. However, after the 2019 Steering Committee meeting, Window 2 was refocused to include initiatives stemming from the Track II dialogues. Implementing the new focus of subnational peacebuilding began during the fourth quarter of 2020

with significant impact and lessons learnt for engaging further on a sub-national level.

2.1 Community safety package

Some organizations were able to make progress in connecting armed groups and security forces to improve civilian protection during the conflict. Emerging from Track II dialogues, it was suggested to involve communities in holding security actors accountable and prioritizing local needs – ultimately leading to the creation of an informal network for civil society organizations (CSOs).

Chaired by the OSEGSY Security Sector Reform team, the network developed initiatives under Window 2 that included safety campaigns and community-security consultations. These initiatives – supported by experienced international organizations and Yemeni CSOs – began in December 2020 with oversight from OSEGSY and UNDP.

While primarily aiming to ease the conflict's impact on civilians, the projects allowed communities and civil society to propose locally tailored security arrangements for OSEGSY's Track I process. The initiatives included the (a) Safer school project; (b) Support to human rights capacity-building sessions with local security forces; and (c) Enhanced community safety and protection.

The extensive authorization process resulted in a delay to the start of the initiatives. Two of the initiatives were completed during the first quarter of 2022 while one initiative was finalized in the third quarter of 2022 due to re-escalation of fighting in the project's area of implementation.

2.1.1 Supporting the resilience and emergency capacity of schools in Yemen

The Safer Schools Yemen initiative, launched by Safer Yemen in late 2020, aided the safe return to schools. It focuses on advocating safety awareness and student return. Despite delays due to the authorization process, the project achieved the following:

- The National Manual for Safety in Schools was approved by national authorities and contributed to improved security in schools.
- Safer Yemen secured Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with both Ministries of Education (MoE), as well as SCMCHA's authorization.
- Gender-inclusive committees consist of 60 per cent women leaders and addresses specific needs of women teachers and students.
- 95 teachers and officials (27 women, 68 men) were trained, benefiting 3,146 teachers and staff (1,695 women, 1,451 men) across the governorates of Aden, Al-Mahweet, Sana'a, Shabwa, and Taiz.
- 50 schools (14 girls, 23 boys, 13 co-ed) devised safety response plans, benefiting 51,539 students (24,722 girls, 26,817 boys).
- Awareness efforts included radio and TV broadcasts, guides, banners, and materials, which resulted in community leaders and imams requesting safety training in their areas.

2.1.2 Support human rights capacity-building sessions with local security forces in Aden, Taiz, Shabwa, Hadramout, and Marib governorates

The initiative was tabled by Partner in Law and Policy Group (PILPG) and aimed to enhance dialogue and trust between local communities and local government authorities. The project achieved the following:

Developed a baseline survey tool to assess local trust in safety institutions. PILPG established baselines in Aden, Hadramout, Marib, Shabwa, and Taiz through 845 community representatives (323 women and 522 men), informing future programming.

- Created a network of five local CSOs across governorates. Trained 72 intermediaries (29 women and 43 men), 15 local police (1 woman and 14 men) and held 225 community forums involving 6,335 representatives (2,559 women and 3,776 men). The training included a chapter on procedures for working with women prisoners, gender responsive treatment, gender sensitivity, daily work policies, and principles for dealing with children accompanying their imprisoned mothers.
- Enhanced security forces' accountability by conducting 135 community dialogues, engaging 1,199 participants from various sectors (304 women and 896 men). Overlapping security force mandates and the volatile conflict in Taiz, delayed critical activities including capacity building, community forums, dialogues, and security-supportive initiatives.

- Increased women's presence at a decision-making level where advocacy and communication efforts resulted in the appointment of six women police officers to Assistant Heads of Police Stations for a new department called "Family Protection" in eight Aden directorates. These accomplished women underwent specialized training, a facet of the comprehensive 102-women police training initiative.

2.1.3 Enhance community safety and protection in Yemen (Aden, Marib, and Taiz)

Enhancing Community Protection and Safety initiative tabled by the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) aimed at promoting the protection of civilians in Aden, Marib, and Taiz. Throughout its lifespan, the project:

- Established three (3) Community Protection Groups (CPGs) in Aden, Marib, and Taiz. After extensive training on Civilian Harm Mitigation (CHM), Protection of Civilians (POC), and advocacy, CPGs held monthly community meetings with a focus on improving relations with security forces to address concerns. These allowed for a safe space where issues facing vulnerable groups could be raised and where 262 participants (187 women and 75 men) received training. Additionally, women only training of the trainers (TOT) workshops were held that targeted 15 women officers from armed and security forces within the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and security belt in Aden on Protection of Civilians (POC) and Civilian Harm Mitigation (CHM) mechanisms.
- Hosted six (6) civil-military dialogues across various locations. The first round of dialogues addressed civilian concerns, accountability measures, and principles

of civilian rights, engaging 138 participants (44 women and 94 men). Topics included arbitrary detentions at check points, speeding vehicles in residential areas, and poor coordination between humanitarian organizations. The second round focused on establishing, presenting, and implementing accountability measures.

- Reached 38 districts to amplify CPG concerns via live radio shows and messages to sensitize public awareness.

- Conducted 20 POC and CHM training sessions for security forces, using a cascade ToT approach. 401 participants (52 women, 349 men) benefitted, with an additional session targeting women officers. In the workshop evaluations, it was noted that additional training is needed as some participants felt the training was not thorough enough.

2.2.1 Rehabilitation of water infrastructure in Dhamar and Maghreb Ans

The Berghof Foundation proposed an initiative based on their consultations with three communities in Maghreb Ans and Dhamar city. The initiative aimed to promote grassroots peacebuilding by resolving water-related conflicts in the Al-Jadid and Ruma neighbourhoods, providing safe drinking water and rehabilitating the Dhaba pumping station for the Maghreb Ans district. The total number of beneficiaries in the three sites is 8,053. Additionally, mediation between the local communities and authorities was assisted by the Berghof Foundation and their local partner, Political Development Forum (PDF).

Significant implementation delays were faced as the initially contracted company Public Works Project (PWP) faced challenges delivering and, after UNDP's engineers examined the completed assessments, it was deemed that an additional assessment was necessary. At the time of writing, the project is expected to be finalized in the third quarter of 2023, under PSF Phase II.

2.3.1 Clearing a path to peace: A cleaning campaign on the frontlines of Taiz

A DeepRoot Consulting proposal in Taiz suggests a clean-up campaign to remove garbage near the conflict's frontlines that divide the city. This involved negotiating a brief ceasefire for workers to clear trash and move freely between areas. Besides improving public health, the goal is to build trust between parties (relevant to Track I and II), form a humanitarian corridor, and reduce hostilities. Conflict-related security concerns led to an initial delay and have now fully prevented implementation.

2.4. Potential initiatives tabled from 2021 onward

2.4.1 Gender equality interventions

A key concern raised in the 2021 mid-term evaluation was that the PSF *"falls short in addressing gender equality."* To address this, the PSF recruited a Gender and Social Inclusion Specialist who was deployed in October 2021.

In 2022, the PSF Gender Strategy was finalized, guiding implementation across the PSF project portfolio and increasing a focus on gender mainstreaming in Window 2 initiatives. In addition to the Gender Strategy, results included training provided to implementing partners, ensuring gender-quotas for project activities, and increasing

efforts to collect disaggregated gender data.

PSF worked proactively to amplify the voice of women and prioritized building their community safety and protection capacity, as well as initiatives pertaining to human rights capacity. Additionally, the gender strategy identified the need for standalone gender initiatives and created a GEN 3¹ output implemented under Window 2.

In response, a project to establish and support the Peacebuilding Network at Women Research and Training Center (WRTC) of Aden University was implemented beginning of September 2022. The project focused on Aden University Gender Studies Programme graduates who joined the network, have a robust network in Yemen and are employed in private companies, public institutions, or non-profit organizations. From September 2022 to 01 March 2023, the end of the PSF Phase I, the initiatives accomplished the following:

- Establishing the network at Aden University with 100 members (75 per cent women, 25 per cent men) who regularly participate in various network-organized activities.
- Developing the Terms of Reference and work plan for the network, as well as conducting a conference to announce launching the network.

¹ GEN 3 projects have gender equality and/or the empowerment of women and girls as the primary or principal objective. See UNDP's [Gender Equality Strategy 2022](#) for more information.

- Enhancing network member capacity to implement the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda to (a) create an advocacy strategy; (b) govern from a gender perspective; (c) apply mechanisms of dialogue and negotiation; and (d) integrate gender analysis into project design and programme management. An impressive 83 per cent

of the trainees indicated that the training has improved their abilities and skills in gender analysis and its integration into project and programme management. This resulted in community members embracing the WPS agenda and employing gender-sensitive language to champion women's rights within their respective professional domains.



Photo: Aden University workshop

2.4.2 Support the National Action Plan to implement the WPS agenda

In late 2021, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC/NORCAP) engaged a national and an international technical expert based in Aden to support the implementation of the WPS National Action Plan (NAP) in Yemen. Due to the significant results achieved, UNDP and NORCAP agreed to continue support until the end of 2023.

Since their deployment, the experts have provided technical support and guidance to Yemen's internationally recognized government and CSOs to operationalize the

NAP and mainstream the WPS agenda objectives into their institutional work. During PSF Phase I, the two experts succeeded in:

- Providing trainings to the NAP operational entity comprising of representatives from eight (8) ministries and four (4) CSOs and led by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MOSAL). This included localizing the NAP, reviewing sectoral policies, and setting up policy recommendations that are responsive to WPS issues and needs.
- Supporting the NAP operational entity to conduct a needs assessment of citizens' security concerns. A partner CSO recruited nine (9) women and eight (8) men to conduct the assessment. The 17-member assessment team were provided with seven days of training on gender analysis, qualitative methods of data collection and analysis, and developing an assessment report. The assessment's preliminary findings were endorsed by the Aden governorate's security sector leadership and disseminated to all stakeholders involved in the NAP institutional structure.
- Supporting MOSAL to develop a NAP policy for coordination and monitoring that was discussed with national stakeholders and approved by the MOSAL Minister who serves as the NAP Steering Committee chair. The policy focuses on enhancing coordination and information sharing between all gender and WPS-related interventions implemented in the IRG-controlled areas. It also aims to establish a gender and WPS database to measure NAP activity impact, as well as other related activities. MOSAL has been coordinating with international agencies working in Yemen, seeking technical and financial support to implement the policy procedures.



Photo: WPS TEAM

Output 3: Transitional governance and post-peace agreement arrangements are supported as, and when, the parties agree

Output 3 was included in the PSF as a placeholder for a potential peace agreement; however, a long-term agreement was not reached. For PSF Phase II modified Output 3 to not only focus on a peace agreement agreed to by the parties.

Output 4: The Project Management Unit of the Peace Support Facility is set up and operational

According to the PSF project document, the Project Management Unit (PMU) was anticipated to reach nine staff by 2022. Although this was achieved, the configuration was changed to match the demand. With extensive work in Hodeidah, the PSF recruited a Project Manager to oversee the implementation and engage with YRSPC. Additionally, a Marine Engineer and a Civil Engineer were recruited in Hodeidah to oversee and inspect deliverables.

To allow for the required PSF responsiveness and agility, a Finance Specialist and Strategic Planning Specialist were recruited in 2022.

Overarching Output: Supporting the peace process in Yemen with fast, flexible initiatives that deliver tangible, rapid improvements in the daily lives of people, and reinforce and build public support for the political process.

The PSF has, to a large extent, successfully delivered on this output by providing a facility that supports the peace process, however volatile that process has been. But as noted in the MTR, the lack of understanding of the facility's purpose highlights the disconnect between the project outputs and the reality on the ground, noting that the objectives and outcomes may not be measurable. However, many of them are beyond the influence of the PSF.

Links to the UNDP Country Programme Document/Framework

UNDP Country Programme Framework (CPF) Outcome 3: Yemenis contribute to and benefit from peacebuilding processes.

The PSF has contributed to Outcome 3 extensively by including more than 50,000 Yemenis in the peacebuilding process through Window 2.

UNDP CPF Outcome 1: Yemenis contribute to – and benefit from – inclusive, accountable, and gender-responsive governance at local and central levels.

By focusing on gender mainstreaming throughout its programming, the PSF has contributed to Outcome 1. The PSF has furthermore focused on the accountability of security forces towards the civilian population through its Window 2.

ACHIEVEMENTS AGAINST THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK

Indicator	Accumulated target	End of project	Remark
Project Output 1: The implementation of the Stockholm Agreement or any other future agreement are supported through initiatives agreed by the parties			
1.1 Number of confidence-building initiatives	2	1	Partially achieved. Port of Hodeidah was rehabilitated but another initiative was not agreed to by the parties. Sana'a International Airport was suggested but access was never granted.
1.2 Number of infrastructures rehabilitated	2	4	Over- achieved. Rehabilitation of the generator shelter workshop, training center, and slipway was achieved.
Project Output 2: Discreet activities emerging out of Track II initiatives are implemented with the goal of catalyzing the political process.			
2.1 Number of recommendations emerged from Track II dialogues implemented	3	3	Fully achieved. All three recommended initiatives have been implemented. Additionally, one stand-alone gender project and one water rehabilitation project was implemented.
2.2 Number of locations targeted by PSF peace-related interventions	7	8	Over-achieved.
2.3 Number of people benefiting from improved services and living conditions	2000	52,232	Over-achieved. The implementation of the community safety initiatives has reached more than 50,000 direct beneficiaries.
Project Output 3: Transitional governance arrangements are supported as and when the parties agree.			
3.1 Number of transitional mechanisms supported by PSF	0	0	Not achieved. This indicator was introduced after the revision of the project document following the Steering Committee's decision in September 2019. This output has been realigned for the PSF Phase II.
3.2 Number of core institutions assisted	0	0	Not achieved. This indicator was introduced only after revision of the project document following the Steering Committee's decision in September 2019. This output has been realigned for the PSF Phase II.
Project Output 4: The Project Management Unit of the Peace Support Facility is set up and operational			
4.1 Number of PSF project staff recruited	9	10	Over-achieved, however, the staffing structure has varied to meet the demand.

PROJECT RISKS AND ISSUES

Several risks were included in the project document, including political and reputational risk, operational risk, financial risk, programmatic risk, and security risk. These risks remained relevant throughout the project; however, they were largely mitigated through the established mechanisms. Risk that was not included in the project document included:

- Underestimated cost

On multiple occasions, the original cost estimates provided by external consultants were significantly exceeded once re-estimated by UNDP engineers or when second opinions were received. For example, the water rehabilitation in Magreb Ans and Dhamar (Activity 2.2) was initially estimated at US\$ 80,000 but when re-assessed, the final cost of the two sites was US\$ 500,000,000.

- Approval and clearances

Throughout the project, delays occurred because of clearances and approvals. For example, the Hodeidah-bound buoys were kept with the manufacturer for several months while awaiting the Evacuation and Humanitarian Operations Committee (EHOC) clearance. They were eventually relocated to Djibouti while finalizing the EHOC clearance.

- Changing political dynamics

Yemen's conflict remained dynamic throughout the implementation of PSF Phase I. This impacted the projects as priorities of the parties, the UN agencies, and donors continued to change. For the Port of Hodeidah, this was particularly relevant as a large portion of the PSF

budget was tied to rehabilitation interventions which could not be re-allocated as priorities changed.

a. Updated project risks and actions

Project Risk 1: Security conditions impede staff deployment, mobility, and face-to-face consultations with stakeholders.

Actions taken: Continuous monitoring of political and security developments was done in close coordination with the RCO and OSESGY. During PSF Phase I, this has not had significant impact on the project.

Project Risk 2: Residual risk of project implementation is assessed as too high.

Actions taken: Through UN senior management's engagement with the parties, it was ensured that parties recognized that implementation is predicated by the need for robust independent risk assessment.

Project Risk 3: In the absence of peace agreement, space for peace support activities remains limited.

Actions taken: In consultation with the UN Special Envoy and the RC/HC, it was proposed to the Steering Committee that the PSF can support more local-level initiatives by implementing suggestions stemming out of Track II dialogues. For Phase II, the PSF will continue to implement subnational peacebuilding including a small grant mechanism.

Project Risk 4: Perception by the parties of partiality and unfairness of project activities.

Actions taken:

Close and regular coordination between the RC/HC, the Special Envoy, and the UNDP Resident Representative took place to ensure equity of PSF interventions and gauge parties' acceptance.

Project Risk 5: Lack of resources and capacity undermine project implementation.

Actions taken:

Regular coordination with donors took place to ensure necessary resources were in place. Resources were initially in place, however, a significant increase in resources would be required if all priorities on the Port of Hodeidah were to be implemented.

Project Risk 6: Local ownership by Yemeni partners is limited by a lack of confidence in peace and the UN.

Actions taken:

Through engagement of UN senior management with the parties, agreement from authorities at all levels was secured. UNDP established a National Steering Committee for the port project to ensure stronger buy-in and address bottlenecks in implementation.

Project risk 7: Recommendations emerging from Track II partners do not fit the scope of the PSF.

Actions taken:

An operationalization document was developed to clarify the scope, criteria, and procedures of Window 2. Coordination with OSESGY and donors was done to organize a Track II coordination meeting in early 2020. Throughout Phase I, this did not materialize as a risk.

b. Updated project issues and actions

Project Issue 1: A key issue of the PSF has been coordination as the project is positioned between multiple stakeholders and is tasked with a supportive role to the peace process. Throughout the lifespan of

Phase I, the PSF has introduced various platforms to ensure coordination with key stakeholders.

Actions taken:

- A PSF coordination group with UNDP, the RCO, and OSESGY has been established. The group meets on a regular basis to identify project opportunities for the PSF, conduct risk and feasibility assessments of the proposed initiatives, and address implementation bottlenecks.
- Technical-level coordination has taken place with donors to brief them on PSF progress and solicit feedback about possible future interventions and approaches. The project team maintained regular contact with donors to revise the project document and develop the phase 2 project document, cost sharing agreements, and establish new agreements. The regular bilateral exchanges are also an opportunity to answer specific demands from donors.
- The PSF Steering Committee – a high-level platform with the UN Special Envoy, the Resident Coordinator, the UNDP Resident Representative, and senior representatives from donor countries meet biannually to provide the overarching strategic perspective for the PSF. It also serves to table suggestions, new projects, and coordinate existing efforts.
- The Port Project Technical Committee – a platform consisting of all the project partners (UNDP, The Port of Hodeidah Technical Committee, a platform consisting of all the project partner (UNDP, UNMHA, YRSPC, and WFP). The committee met to discuss technical issues specific to the PSF port to provide a platform where decisions, foreseen changes, or emerging initiatives can be discussed.

Project Issue 2: PSF faced challenges to ensure equal representation of women and men in the community dialogues, in the training for nominated security staff, and to encourage facilitation by women intermediaries. The PSF set a participation quota of 30 per cent to 50 per cent as a prerequisite to ensure higher participation of women.

Actions taken:

Gender quotas for participants needed to be stressed so, toward the end of the project, the quota resulted in local communities showing more respect for, and more trust in, women facilitators and women to convey messages to decision makers.

Project Issue 3: In the PSF's MTR, a key finding was the questionable financial sustainability of the project and its impact on the port. Without further assistance, it is unlikely that the port will be fully rehabilitated, it is also unlikely that the rehabilitated infrastructure will be maintained.

Action taken:

While it is difficult to manage this issue, the PSF has to the extent possible procured additional spare parts for key port infrastructure. This will increase longevity of some port operations such as the slipway and tugboats.

Project Issue 4: The facility has not had a communication strategy or dedicated communication staff, resulting in communication not being prioritized. International partners and other stakeholders have not been included in PSF progress. This led to some misunderstanding and to perceptions that the PSF have been underachieving.

Action taken:

The PSF Phase II includes significant communication efforts, including bringing dedicated communications capacity, monthly updates, and a larger communication budget.



Photo : UNDP Yemen. Port of Hodeidah.

LESSONS LEARNED

Key project successes

The Port of Hodeidah

The Facility had a large impact on the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement through the rehabilitation efforts at the Port of Hodeidah. The contributions have significantly increased the capacity of the port and the safety at sea.

The FSO Safer Salvage Operation

The initial project document and initial staff working on the salvage operation of the FSO Safer was the PSF. Operational staff continued to support the FSO Safer operation, especially relating to finance and the large-scale procurement. The expertise harnessed and the experience gained by staff has been invaluable.

The Community Safety Package

The Community Safety Package was successfully implemented benefitting at least 50,000 people across seven governorates in Yemen. Collectively the projects opened a dialogue and provided space for civilians to engage with security forces directly resulting in changes to people's daily lives. This includes the removal of unnecessary checkpoints and better engagement between security and civilians at checkpoints.

The Aden University Peacebuilding Network

Although not established until close to the end of PSF Phase I, the efforts throughout the phase resulted in establishment of the network with a far-reaching membership of gender experts spreading throughout institutions, NGOs, and private companies in southern Yemen.

Challenges

The lack of progress in the political process

The optimism of 2018 and the Stockholm Peace Agreement was quickly halted as the conflict became more volatile throughout 2019, continuing until the 2022 ceasefire. However, the ceasefire did not result in a continued peace process and dialogue, and it has been challenging in Phase I to identify new interventions for implementation. The changing political dynamics also meant that the priority projects, including high-cost projects like the Port of Hodeidah, became less important politically while the rehabilitation work was either ongoing or committed to, resulting in a loss of appetite from donors.

Working relationship with government authorities

During the first years of the PSF, it was difficult to access the port as restrictions were enforced by the YRSPC. The restrictions were slowly lifted throughout the project – catalyzed by a high-level Steering Committee meeting – and the working relationship with the corporation developed positively. Approvals for the implementing partners to conduct their activities under Window 2 were also delayed significantly as the authorities continuously requested more information.

Restriction on PSF staff

Visas have been delayed for some international staff which resulted in difficulties in monitoring interventions.

What could have been done differently?

Most of the issues that could have been done differently were accounted for in the MTR, adjusted for in the Strategic Framework, and included in the Phase II project document. This includes, but is not limited to:

- **The reorientation away from high-level political interventions and toward Track II interventions.**

This has been strengthened for PSF Phase II where more attention is given to sub-national peacebuilding.

- **The need for a wider reference group.**

The PSF was highly dependent upon OSESGY and the RCO identifying priorities and initiatives; however, it may have been more productive to include other actors and engage more actively in the various Track II and civil society forums. This also includes changing the staff composition slightly so that additional programmatic experts could engage meaningfully in developing projects and the PSF programme. In planning for Phase II, the PSF has for instance based the project manager in Amman to enable increased participation in various thematic forums and highlighted that programmatic experts will be added to the staffing structure.

Recommendations

- Strike a balance between rapid implementation and strong governance mechanisms.

The PSF has received feedback that its governance mechanism slows, the process however, it has been necessary to establish these mechanisms to ensure quality assurance, conflict sensitivity and buy-in from all stakeholders. The PSF needs to find a balance where both objectives are met.

- Define the comparative advantage of the PSF.

Re-orienting the PSF to focus more sub-national peacebuilding, and not relying heavily on the outcome of the national level political process, will enable more independence and more security in terms of delivery. It also necessitates the PSF to clearly define its comparative advantage against other portfolios of the UNDP and other UN agencies. This was also pointed out in the MTR, where the lack of a comprehensive vision and strategy was mentioned.



Photo: Community members collecting water in Dhamar I

CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD

The PSF has been able to a large extent to fulfil its mandate as outlined in the results framework through its achievements on the Port of Hodeidah, the implementation of the community safety package, and the rehabilitation of the Dhamar water infrastructure. Furthermore, it has established a peacebuilding network at the University of Aden focused on gender equality, and assisted the internationally recognized government with implementing the NAP on WPS.

Despite the success, the full ambition of the PSF was not realized. As mentioned, the PSF was reoriented in December 2020 to include implementation of Track II initiatives, which did increase its relevance in the absence of a sustained peace process.

The shortcomings and delays of the PSF related to the predefined results in the project document are largely the result of external factors, like the absence of a peace process and delays on rehabilitation efforts due to extensive clearance and approval process. The delayed activities have been moved to the PSF Phase II where they will be expedited, along with the funding tied to these specific activities.

In defining PSF Phase II, the focus on sub-national peacebuilding have been kept, providing more manoeuvrability and less reliance on the political process. Meanwhile a Result Area 1 has been established for confidence building initiatives that can be critical for advancing peace and stability. Result Area 3 focused on specialized projects which, to date, has only included the FSO Safer salvage operation.



Photo : UNDP Yemen. FSO Safer

FINANCIAL STATUS

PSF Phase-1 Provisional Financial Report, January 2019 - March 2023

DONORS	CONTRIBUTION US\$	¹ EXPENDITURE 2019-2022 US\$	² FUND UTILISED JAN-MAR 2023 US\$	TOTAL FUND UTILIZED US \$	BALANCE RESOURCE US\$	UTILIZA- TIONS PERCEN- TAGE
	A	B	C	D (B+C)	E (A-D)	F (D/A)
CANADA	2,693,799	1,655,814	277,068	1,932,881	760,918	72%
DENMARK	2,104,947	971,167	758,514	1,729,681	375,266	82%
EUROPEAN UNION	1,118,900	1,118,900	0	1,118,900	0	100%
FRANCE	1,098,901	1,098,170	0	1,098,170	730.65	100%
GERMANY	5,116,868	4,287,678	0	4,287,678	829,191	84%
ITALY	1,405,499	397,505	827,164	1,224,668	180,830	87%
NETHERLA NDS	2,246,966	2,216,326	20,524	2,236,850	10,116	100%
NORCAP	295,183	194,253	64,045	258,298	36,885	88%
NORWAY	1,072,464	521,879	450,127	972,005	100,459	91%
SWEDEN	1,077,702	569,300	508,403	1,077,703	0	100%
SWISS DEV CORP (SDC)	1,016,260	633,216	383,043	1,016,259	1	100%
UNDP	377,904	377,904	0	377,904	0	100%
UNITED KINGDOM	2,094,241	1,684,095	409,910	2,094,005	236	100%
GRAND TOTAL	21,719,635	15,726,205	3,698,798	19,425,003	2,294,632	89%

²Funds utilized includes the provisional expenditure and the contractual commitments as of March 2023.

ANNEX

Publications on and from the Peace Support Facility:

Project web page [LINK](#)

Project summary [LINK](#)

Fast fact sheet [LINK](#)

Gender Strategy [LINK](#)

2022 Annual Report [LINK](#)

2021 Annual Report [LINK](#)

2020 Annual Report [LINK](#)

2019 Annual Report [LINK](#)

UNDP, *Damage and Capacity Damage and Capacity Assessment for Ports of Hodiedah, Salif and Ras Issa*, 12 April 2020. [LINK](#)

UNDP, Raising Awareness: School Emergency Preparedness, 27 April 2022, [LINK](#)

OSESGY, Press Release on EU Contribution To The Peace Support Facility, 24 August 2023, [LINK](#)



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60th Meter Road
P.O. Box: 551 Sana'a, Republic of Yemen

www.undp.org/yemen

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